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SUMMARY 
Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, women and girls are denied their right to inherit from their 
husbands and fathers as a result of the operation of the indigenous law rule of male 
primogeniture, in terms of which an heir must be male. This violates prohibitions on gender 
discrimination, as well as other, more specific provisions found in international human rights 
treaties. However, courts in both South Africa and Zimbabwe have in recent years upheld the 
rule. States Parties to relevant treaties have an obligation to ensure equal inheritance rights for 
women and girls. In the case of South Africa, provisions of the Constitution are also relevant. 
After discussing the operation of the indigenous law of inheritance, the international human 
rights provisions violated by it, as well as the recommendations of the South African Law 
Commission and legislative proposals on this issue, the writer suggests that legislation should be 
adopted to ensure equality for women and girls, while retaining the positive aspects of indigenous 
law and culture. 
KEY TERMS: Indigenous law, sub-Saharan Africa, culture, inheritance, male primogeniture, 
distortion of indigenous law, duty of support, gender equality, international human rights norms, 
international law, treaties, Constitution, Bill of Rights, universality, non-discrimination, 
accountability, cultural relativism, judicial resolution, legislation, South African Law 
Commission. 
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I. Introduction 
Women who are married under African customary, or indigenous law, do not have the 
same rights to inheritance as those married under the general law of the land. In the 
absence of legislation providing otherwise, this is the case most countries of sub-
Saharan Africa. 
It is my contention in this paper that this is not only severely detrimental to the well-
being of women and their children, but is also in violation of international human 
rights norms, where the country in which a woman lives is a signatory to relevant 
international human rights treaties. Yet the courts have not found it so. Therefore I 
will elaborate on and give justification for this argument in this paper. 
An argument can (and has) been made that women's position under indigenous law in 
South Africa is contrary to the constitutional guarantees of gender equality. I will 
focus on the situation in South Africa and Zimbabwe, where courts have in recent 
years upheld discriminatory inheritance laws. 1 However, most of what follows is true 
for vast numbers of women throughout Africa, at least those living in countries that 
have not intervened legislatively in the rules relating to inheritance by women in 
terms of indigenous law. As Church and Edwards state, "it is clear that in the 
multitude of tribal laws of the many African peoples of non-Western origin who are 
still embedded in the tribal and customary milieu, there are fundamental underlying 
principles that are uniform. 112 My focus will therefore be on international human rights 
norms, not domestic ones. 
II. Indigenous law - the past and present 
The argument I make in this paper, namely that the African indigenous law concept of 
succession by male primogeniture is a violation of women's human rights, is not 
1 See Mthembu v Letsela, 1997 (2) SA 936 (T); Mthembu v Letsela, 1998 (2) SA 675 (T); 
Mthembu v Letsela, 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA); Venia Magaya v Nakayi Shoniwa Magaya, Zimbabwe 
Supreme Court Civil Appeal No 635/92, unreported. 
2 Church and Edwards, "Introduction to Indigenous Law and the Comparative Method", in Hosten et 
al . ., Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory (1995), 1248, at 1251. The rules regarding 
succession are broadly similar among different groups, at least in South Africa and Zimbabwe. See also 
South African Law Commission, "Customary Law", Discussion Paper 93, Project 90, 2000, at 25. 
meant as a wholesale attack on indigenous law. The African legal tradition and the 
traditional African concept of family have positive attributes not found in their 
Western equivalents.3 The traditional concept of the extended family, and the pre-
eminence given to mediation of conflicts, for example, stand to benefit women and 
families and help them cope in times of change and upheaval.4 What is needed is to 
retain these positive attributes of indigenous law, within the context of ensuring 
women's human rights. 
However, indigenous law has been so distorted by years of colonial manipulation, and 
in the case of South Africa by apartheid, that it is sometimes difficult to determine just 
what its true nature is. The South African Law Commission (SALC) notes that it is 
"now generally acknowledged that the 'official version' of customary law, although 
frequently consulted as the most readily available source, is often inaccurate and 
misleading. "5 
Colonial administrators found that Africans governed their relations by unwritten 
rules or practices that were very different from European concepts of law. In order to 
assert their control over Africans, they attempted a compromise between principles 
that made sense to themselves and those that had meaning for their subjects and 
accorded with their social values. To this end they sought Western equivalents for 
local principles and superimposed these on indigenous law when they set about 
codifying or restating it.6 In this way, principles of indigenous law were corrupted into 
something they weren't before, with little social basis for their existence.7 "This has 
resulted in the creation of much 'paper law', or law at variance with the practices of 
the people, and therefore lacking in legitimacy, as well as effectiveness. 118 
3 See Bronstein, "Reconceptualizing the customary law debate in South Africa'', South African Journal 
of Human Rights, Vol. 14 (1998), 388, at 409; Church, "Constitutional equality and the position of 
women in a multi-cultural society", Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa, Vol. 
XXVIII (1995), 289, at 295. 
4 See Armstrong et al .. , "Uncovering reality: Excavating women's rights in African family law", 
International Journal of Law and the Family 7 (1993), 314, at 319 for a more detailed discussion of the 
social and economic meaning of the extended character of the African family. 
5 South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at 24. 
6 See Bronstein, supra note 3, at 397. 
7 See Van der Meide, "Gender Equality vs. Right to Culture", The South African Law Journal, Volume 
116, Part I (1999), 100 at 105; Church and Edwards, supra note 2, at 1253; Dlamini, "The future of 
African customary law" in Sanders (ed.), The Internal Conflict of Laws in South Africa (1990), I at 3,4. 
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In time, these distorted principles were defended as true "customs" by those who 
stood to gain.9 Male African leaders latched on to concepts that had the potential of 
entrenching their power, concepts given legitimacy and enforced by colonial or 
apartheid powers. In this, African leaders were supported by colonial or apartheid 
governments, who needed them to maintain control over their subjects. These leaders 
became accountable to the colonial (or apartheid) governments, no longer primarily to 
their own people, destroying one of the most important checks on power in 
indigenous law. 10 Indigenous law as we now know it, is aptly described by Currie as 
"the product of a long history of collaboration between colonial administrators and 
indigenous elites and [was] not the lived 'folk' law it is claimed to be". 11 Indigenous 
law "is more an invented tradition than a 'genuine product of African culture' ."12 
What has made this corruption of indigenous law even more problematic is that it was 
codified - set in stone, so to speak. 13 Culture is flexible - social and cultural norms are 
continually evolving as social change happens and new challenges and opportunities 
arise, very often through contact with other cultures. 14 The strength of indigenous law 
in its original concept, was that it adapted with the times, as internal and external 
factors brought about cultural change, while retaining its essential nature. The 
codification of indigenous law upset this natural relationship by fixing rules in place 
and letting them stagnate while the culture continued evolving. "Codification of the 
previously fluid customary law system not only created a set of rules designed to 
uphold values and meanings approved by the colonial authorities and powerful 
indigenous groups, it also fixed these rules in rigid legal form, reducing its (sic) 
capacity for development and change."15 In this way, indigenous law lost one of its 
8 Dlamini, supra note 7, at 3. 
9 See Kaganas and Murray, "The Contest between Culture and Gender Equality under South Africa's 
Interim Constitution", Journal of Law and Society Volume 21, Number 4, ( 1994 ), 409 at 423 
10 See Bronstein, supra note 3, at 397. 
11 Currie, "The Future of Customary Law: Lessons from the Lobo lo Debate" (1994) Acta Juridica 146, 
at 146, quoted in Bronstein, supra note 3, at 398. See also Kaganas and Murray, supra note 9, at 424. 
12 Sinclair, "Pluralism in South African Marriage Laws: Race, Culture and Religion'', in The Law of 
Marriage, Vol. 1 (1996) 207, at 240, fn 94. 
13 See Kaganas and Murray, supra note 9, at 423; Bronstein, supra note 3, at 394, 398. 
14 See Kaganas and Murray, supra note 9, at 421-423. For discussions of culture as a construct, see 
Ibid., at 425; Costa, "The Myth of Customary Law", South African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 14 
(1998), 525, at 530. 
15 Kaganas and Murray, supra note 9, at 423. See also Van der Meide, supra note 7, at 111; Dlamini, 
supra note 7, at 4. 
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most important attributes. As the SALC notes, "[t]he customary law with which we 
now have to deal is, in many respects both inequitable and out of date. 1116 
The corruption of indigenous rules by Western concepts and their loss of flexibility, 
combined with the patriarchal nature of both Western law at the time of codicification 
and indigenous law, resulted in a body of rules that very often discriminates against 
women. For example, the exact nature of a woman's status within the family had no 
exact equivalent in Western law, but the concept of guardianship seemed to be the 
closest match. The principle that a woman was under the perpetual guardianship of a 
male - her father or husband, most often - so found its way into indigenous law. Not 
only did it make sense in terms of western legal concepts, but would serve to entrench 
male power. It is, however, a distortion of the true nature of a woman's position in 
pre-colonial society. 17 
A note of caution is in order here. Although women were better off than under 
codified indigenous law, the pre-colonial African society they lived in was decidedly 
patriarchal and so were its rules. This provided fertile ground for the further 
subjugation of women through the distorted codification of indigenous law. 18 African 
society today is still, as Church and Edwards put it, "typically patriarchal."19 
In a patriarchal system, men hold the power and the purse strings. Armstrong et al 
observe that"[ o ]ften, men own and control the basic resources of most families and 
thereby acquire leverage over women. In this scenario women suffer from inequality 
which is either sanctioned by law or at least to which the law turns a blind eye. "20 A 
woman's status becomes especially precarious when her husband dies. 
16 See South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at 12. 
17 Church, supra note 3, at 295-296. 
18 See Kaganas and Murray, supra note 9, at 423. 
19 Church and Edwards, supra note 2, at 1261. See also South African Law Commission, supra note 2, 
at 7; The South African Law Commission notes that "customary laws of succession, at least in their 
traditional form, bear the imprint of a pre-colonial society. Patriarchy and an extended family structure 
were two of the most distinctive features of this social order. Patriarchy implied that all significant 
rights and powers were held by senior males. And, for purposes of succession, men were the medium 
through which a family's bloodline was traced. Women were not more than transient members of the 
patriline." Ibid., at 1; 
20 Armstrong et al .. , supra note 4, at 343. 
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III. Inheritance under African indigenous law 
Although indigenous law, in its original form, recognizes the rights of individuals, the 
system is by nature communal rather than individualistic.21 Marriage is not a contract 
between two individuals; it is an agreement between two families. 22 The contract 
between the families includes agreement on what is to be paid by the groom's family 
to the bride's family in terms of bridewealth.23 Both families must consent to the 
marriage and the bride must at least acquiesce.24 Procreation is one of the primary 
functions of an indigenous marriage, which is potentially polygynous. 25 
Except where this has been changed by legislation, a wife married in terms of 
indigenous law has limited locus standi in judicio and limited capacity to own 
property. 26 As interpreted by colonial courts and statutes, a woman is under the legal 
guardianship of her father until marriage, when her husband becomes her guardian. 
She remains a perpetual minor in the eyes of the law.27 
Zimbabwe became one of the first countries to change this situation when it enacted 
the Legal Age of Majority Act in 1982, which gave African women majority status 
upon attaining 18 years of age. 28 A similar provision is contained in Section 9 of 
South Africa's Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 120 of 1998. As Armstrong 
et al put it, "property relations are usually closely related to power relations". 29 What a 
21 See Church and Edwards, supra note 2, at 1252, Reyntjens, "Protecting human rights in sub-Saharan 
Africa: specific problems and challenges", SA Public Law, Vol. 7, No 1 (1992), 40, at 41. 
22 See Sinclair, supra note 12, at 240, fn 95. 
23 See Ibid. at 240. Bridewealth, called by various names, including lobola, is an institution which has 
strong social support, but is increasingly being challenged by African women themselves, as well as 
criticized from outside because of its impact on women's rights and gender equality. Discussion of 
lobola is however outside the scope of this paper. For more information, please refer to Armstrong et 
al.., supra note 4, at 338-339. 
24 See Church and Edwards, supra note 2, at 1260; Myburgh, Papers on Indigenous Law in Southern 
Africa (1985), at 85. 
25 See Church and Edwards, supra note 2, at 1260. 
26 The same would apply to an unmarried man, who is also under the guardianship of the head of the 
family. The difference is that a man becomes a major for all intents and purposes upon marriage or 
upon the death of the family head ifhe is the eldest son. See Myburgh, supra note 24, at 81. 
27 See Stewart and Armstrong (eds), The Legal Situation of Women in Southern Africa, (1990), at 170; 
Armstrong et al.., supra note 4, at 342. 
28 See Stewart and Armstrong (eds), supra note 27, at 169. See also Magaya v Magaya, supra note 1, 
and the discussion of it below. 
29 s ee Armstrong et al.., supra note 4, at 342. 
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married woman earns becomes the property of her house30 and is subject to the control 
of her husband. 31 
Death of the husband does not automatically dissolve a marriage contracted in terms 
of indigenous law. Traditionally the family of the deceased would appoint a levirate 
consort, usually the brother of the deceased, to continue the marriage in his place. The 
wife could not be compelled to accept the arrangement, but very often did, as it was 
usually in her and her children's best interests to remain in the husband's family. 32 
This practice has almost died out (in Southern Africa, at least). The support that it had 
or still has from women is based to a large measure on economic necessity, a 
necessity that would not exist if the widow had the right to inherit from her deceased 
husband. 
Succession in terms of indigenous law33 is usually governed by the principle of male 
primogeniture, meaning that upon the death of the head of a family, his eldest son (or 
in the absence of a son, his father, grandfather or brother) steps into his shoes. 34 The 
original concept of inheritance in terms of indigenous law is that the heir succeeds to 
a position and property, not to the latter alone.35 He takes over the deceased's duties as 
the head of the household and must administer the property for the benefit of the 
family, in consultation with the family. 36 
30 Section 35 of the Black Administration Act, 38of1927, defines a house as" the family and property, 
rights and status, which commence with, attach to, and arise out of, the customary union of each Black 
woman" See Sinclair, supra note 12, at 247. 
31 See Ibid., at 248 
32 See Armstrong et al.., supra note 4, at 348-9; Myburgh, supra note 24, at 87. 
33 Regulation 2(c)-(e) in terms of the Black Administration Act provides for the application of 
customary rules of succession to intestate estates of those married in terms of customary law, unless an 
application is made to the Minister to declare its application inequitable. For more on this see South 
African Law Commission, supra note 2, at 14-16; see also Maithufi, "The Constitutionality of the Rule 
of Primogeniture in Customary Law oflntestate Succession -Mthembu v Letsela 1997 2 SA 935 (sic) 
(T)", THRHR Vol. 61No1, February 1998, 142, at 143. 
34 See Mthembu v Letsela (2000), supra note 1, at 876B; South African Law Commission, supra note 2, 
at 2-3; see also Ibid. at 20-24. 
35 Although the South African Law Commission distinguishes between the terms "inheritance" (of 
property) and "succession" (to status), I have used these terms interchangeably. See South African 
Law Commission, supra note 2, at 1. 
36 See Church and Edwards, supra note 2, at 1259; Sinclair, supra note 12, at 212-213 and 260; 
Armstrong et al., supra note 4, at 325-326. Maithufi makes the point that succession to the status of the 
patriarch "is not necessarily nor inevitably accompanied by the inheritance of property", but that the 
latter is decided at a family meeting some weeks after the burial. It does not seem to be common that 
the wife inherits the homestead, and "[s]uccession to the status of the deceased ... remains the right of 
the eldest son of the deceased's family." Maithufi, supra note 33, at 147. See also Mthembu v Letsela 
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As we have seen, though, traditional practices were distorted during their translation 
into fixed rules. Unfortunately Western concepts of ownership and property rights 
were superimposed on the practice of the heir inheriting duties as well as rights and 
property, resulting in a situation where the accompanying duty is not always accepted 
or fulfilled. 37 And even where the argument that duties are also inherited has been 
used in courts, it has been used to the detriment of women, without a real analysis of 
whether or how these are executed in reality, as will be shown in the discussion of the 
Mthembu and Magaya cases. 
IV. Detrimental effect of the rule of male primogeniture on women and their 
children 
The rule of male primogeniture can and does cause severe hardship for women 
married under indigenous law. Denied ownership of sufficient assets to support them 
or their children, they are economically largely dependent on their husbands; this 
despite the fact that they usually contribute substantially to the growth of the family 
estate.38 
Like all societies, African society is continually evolving and changing. It is very 
different nowadays from the colonial days when indigenous rules were codified.39 
Although there is still strong adherence to indigenous law, this is changing, 
particularly in urban areas. The prevalence of migrant labour as a result of economic 
necessity (and in South Africa the apartheid system), the transformation to a money 
economy from a subsistence economy,40 the growing trend of urbanisation, as well as 
economic globalisation, have resulted in a process of social change, impacting on 
traditional cultural values and the traditional extended family. 41 Dlamini notes that this 
(2000), supra note 1, where Mpati AJA discusses the concept of male primogeniture and states that 
"[w]omen generally do not inherit in customary law". 
37 See South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at 32. 
38 See Sinclair, supra note 12, at 213 
39 See Church and Edwards, supra note 2, at 1253; Van der Meide, supra note 7,at 104. 
40 Dlamini, supra note 7, at 6; see also the South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
41 See Dlamini, supra note 7, at 5-6; Sinclair, supra note 12, at 239, fn 94; South African Law 
Commission, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
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social change "implies fundamental alterations in the social structure or culture of 
people."42 
The emphasis on individuality in the modem state has also had an impact on the 
communal nature of indigenous law,43 resulting in personal well-being and wealth of 
heirs often trumping the well-being and wealth of family members (who are 
sometimes related only through marriage, not blood). These changes cannot be 
ignored in the application of indigenous law. 44 "If law has to remain relevant to the 
lives of the people it purports to govern, it has to reflect these realities. Failure on the 
part of the law to do this will render it of no consequence to the people and 
consequently irrelevant to their lives."45 
In addition to these changes, one of the most marked changes on the African continent 
in the past decade has been the increasing impact of armed conflict on civilians - in 
particular women and children.46 Vast swathes of Africa are currently in the grip of 
armed conflict or its aftermath, affecting the lives of millions.47 Approximately 80% 
of the world's refugees or internally displaced persons are women and children.48 
Women's lack of rights to inherit and own property directly impacts on their ability to 
survive (including protecting themselves against HIV/AIDS49) and support their 
children during and after armed conflict. In Rwanda, to take an extreme example, so 
many men were killed during the genocide, or have been imprisoned in its aftermath. 
42 Dlamini, supra note 7, at 5 
43 See Church and Edwards, supra note 2, at 1252; See Myburgh, supra note 24, at 77-78, who 
mentions the impact oflegislation on separating the individual from the group. 
44 The South African Law Commission notes that one of its major concerns is "to ensure that the 
customary law of succession can cater effectively for all family forms, ancient, modem and emerging." 
South African Law Commission, supra note 2 at 4. 
45 Dlamini, supra note 7, at 6. Van der Meide also emphasises this point, when he says that " customary 
law must be adjusted to meet the needs of modem African society before there can be a restoration of a 
system of law based on traditional indigenous law, which can assume a position of integrity within 
South African jurisprudence." My agreement with Van der Meide is qualified, though - I don't share 
his call for a return to pre-colonial indigenous law, because of its patriarchal nature. Van der Meide, 
supra note 7,at IOI, 104. 
46 See for example Graca Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children - Selected Highlights, New 
York (1996). 
47 For example, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia. These conflicts also impact on countries without 
conflict, due to influx ofrefugees or rebel groups. 
48 See Machel, supra note 46 at 32. 
49 Gough, "Husband-hiring hastens the spread of Aids in Rwanda", The Guardian, 8 February 2000. 
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that men make up only about 20% of the population in some areas.50 Hundreds of 
thousands of women were killed too, however, resulting in an estimated 60 000 
households headed by children, 80% of them headed by girls. 51 Women and girls find 
themselves responsible for caring for their children, siblings, or the children of 
relatives, while being denied access to their husbands' or parents' property and land. In 
many other countries, although on a lesser scale, the problem is the same - many 
women and girls become heads of households without the right to own property or 
inherit it from their deceased husbands and fathers, and as a result their ability to 
support their families is severely impeded. 
Even where there is a male heir, in times of peace or war, the situation can be grim for 
women. They become dependent on someone who may or may not be interested in 
supporting them and their children. As Armstrong et al point out, "[ m ]uch will 
depend on [a widow's] relationship with the heir or anyone else who assumes the 
deceased's role as household head."52 If the heir does not fulfill his fiduciary duties, 
the woman can be left destitute if she does not have some other means of providing 
for her children, for example through working for wages. Her powerlessness makes 
her vulnerable to abuse by the heir or others in the extended family. All these 
problems are exacerbated if she is not a blood relation of the heir (for example if he is 
the son of another wife of the deceased). Without the means to escape this situation, a 
woman can remain trapped by poverty and violence. 
Not only have people's lives changed, but the principles of customary law as practised 
have also developed pragmatically, diverging from the "official version" to be more 
fair to widows and dependant children. 53 The official law should be brought into line 
with this, in particular as it has usually been given precedence over the more flexible 
rules practiced in reality when there has been a dispute and judicial intervention has 
been sought. 54 
50 Ibid 
51 See UNICEF Rwanda 1999 Annual Report (internal document, can provide relevant extract on 
request). 
52 Armstrong et al., supra note 4, at 353. 
53 For a discussion of this aspect, see the South African Law Commission, supra note 2 at 24-31. 
54 South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at 25-26. 
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V. Application of the rule of male primogeniture by the courts 
Courts in both South Africa and Zimbabwe have in recent years pronounced 
themselves on the rule of male primogeniture. They did so as the result of challenges 
by widows that the rule violates their constitutionally guaranteed right to equality. In 
both cases, Mthembu v Letsela55 in South Africa, and Magaya v Magaya56 in 
Zimbabwe, the rule was upheld. 
The facts of the Mthembu case briefly were that the applicant alleged that she had 
been the customary law wife of the deceased, who had died intestate. At the time of 
his death, the deceased was the holder of the leasehold title of a house in Vosloorus, 
Boksburg, in which the deceased, the applicant, their daughter, as well as the parents 
and the sister (and her children) of the deceased lived. The first respondent was the 
father of the deceased, who claimed that, as the deceased had no sons, he was entitled 
to inherit the house in terms of the rule of male primogeniture. The applicant 
challenged the system of intestate succession in terms of indigenous law on the 
ground that it was discriminatory and therefore violated South Africa's interim 
Constitution, Act 200of1993, in force at the time. She argued that in modem urban 
society the rule of male primogeniture has been stripped of its redeeming features, 
namely the duty of maintenance, which the heir also inherits, and that the heir "simply 
acquires the assets of the deceased's estate without assuming any of the 
responsibilities." Her argument was that the rule is "grossly discriminatory against 
African women, and children who are not the eldest child."57 
In terms of the interim Constitution, Le Roux, J defined the question the court had to 
answer as "whether this rule of succession unfairly discriminates between persons on 
the grounds of sex or gender". 58 The court decided that if one "accepts the duty to 
provide sustenance, maintenance and shelter as a necessary corollary of the system of 
primogeniture" it was "difficult to equate this form of differentiation between men 
and women with the concept of 'unfair discrimination' as used in s8 of the 
55 Mthembu v Lets el a ( 1997), supra note 1. 
56 ',, lVlagaya v Magaya, supra note 1. 
57 Mthembu v Letsela (1997), supra note 1, at 941C. 
58 Ibid., at 945E. 
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Constitution."59 In addition the court found that the rule of male primogeniture was 
not contrary to public policy or natural justice.60 
In response to an argument that the rule offends human dignity, a right protected in 
Section 10 of the interim Constitution, the court concluded that, in "its proper setting 
in a tribal community there can be no question that the succession rule preserves 
rather than offends the dignity of the persons affected. It is only in a case where the 
rule is applied in an urban community that there is a possible argument in this 
direction."61 The court, however, did not go into this last issue, as in its view, there 
was a factual dispute which had to be resolved.62 It accordingly referred the matter for 
oral hearing on the factual dispute. 
Because of this qualification by the court, Maithufi is of the view that the court's 
decision "should not be read as express authority for the view that the rule of 
customary law of succession, namely primogeniture, does not unfairly discriminate 
between persons on the ground of sex or gender in terms of our Constitution. 1163 
Maithufi is right, but in my view the weight the court accorded to the duty of support 
and protection shows that it was clinging to an unrealistic vision of African society, 
ignoring rapid urbanisation and the (unfortunate) disintegration of extended family 
networks and loyalties. The court approached the matter from the perspective that the 
duty of support is in reality still the norm, and its absence an aberration, without 
examining whether this is the case in actual fact. In commenting on the judgment, the 
South African Law Commission notes that it is "true that in theory, customary law 
does not leave widows destitute, but we know that in reality, they frequently suffer 
neglect and lack of support. The law is not achieving its objectives, in part because 
the social basis for the official version has changed .... "64 The South African Law 
59 Ibid., at 945H. 
60 Ibid., at 946A. The court was here referring to the so called "repugnancy clause" contained in the 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, in terms of which rules of indigenous law are invalid 
where they are declared to be contrary to public policy or natural justice. In this regard, see Church, 
supra note 3, at 294 
61 Mthembu v Letsela (1997), supra note 1, at 947C. It should perhaps be noted that Yosloorus can be 
described as an urban community. 
62 The first respondent denied that the applicant was married to the deceased in terms of indigenous 
law. This is the type of situation that the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, which requires 
registration of all customary marriages, was designed to rectify. 
63 Maithufi, supra note 33, at 146. 
64 South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at 32. 
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Commission makes the point that the duty of support is a personal right, requiring the 
widow to preserve a good working relationship with the heir, and adds that in modern 
societies, "a person's material security is more effectively guaranteed by real rights, 
namely rights that the holder can assert against the world. "65 This is particularly 
pertinent considering that the duty of support only persists as long as the widow 
remains living with the heir, which is often unrealistic considering crowded 
conditions in cities and the likelihood of a less than amicable relationship between the 
widow and the heir. 66 
It is respectfully submitted that the court failed to analyse the nature of the rights and 
duties inherited critically and thoroughly. It also failed to promote either the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, as it was obliged to do in terms of Section 
35(3) of the interim Constitution (which is substantially similar to Section 39(2) of the 
final Constitution, Act 100of1996) when developing the common or customary law, 
or the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, which Section 35 (1) (substantially similar to Section 39(1)(a) 
in final Constitution) obliged it to do when interpreting the Bill of Rights. It may be 
true that, as Maithufi states, "[t]his decision indicates in no uncertain terms that in the 
interpretation of any law, that is, the common law as well as customary law, the courts 
have to take into account the values that underlie our Constitution."67 However, it is 
my respectful opinion that the court did not truly weigh the impact of the rule against 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights and international human rights 
instruments, nor does its decision promote the values of equality, dignity or freedom. 
The court denied women substantive equality, but instead adhered to a concept of 
formal equality, which is not what the Constitution guarantees. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to critique the court's judgment in terms of the interim Constitution. 
However, denying women and girls the right to inherit property on equal terms with 
men and boys, in favour of the right to be maintained by a man, clearly constitutes 
unfair discrimination. Being dependant on someone else, who holds the power as to 
how and to what extent you and your children are maintained is no substitute for 
65 Ibid at 33. 
66 Ibid at 33 and 39. 
67 Maithufi, supra note 33, at 142. 
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having the decision-making power yourself. Skewed power relations between men 
and women are the essence of gender discrimination, which is the very opposite of 
gender equality, one of the most important values underlying the South African 
Constitution. 
Moreover, Section 35 (1) of the interim Constitution provided that a court, when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights "shall, where applicable, have regard to public 
international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this 
Chapter. .. ". (The equivalent section in the final Constitution, Section 3 9(1 )(b ), 
stipulates that, [w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum ... 
must consider international law". ) This does not mean that it must apply it, but it 
must at least take it into consideration. In other words, when a court is examining the 
impact of the Bill of Rights on the rule of male primogeniture, it must consider 
relevant principles of international law. It is my contention that the court in Mthembu 
v Letsela failed to fulfil this obligation. The applicable principles of international law 
will be discussed below. 
The Mthembu case came before the Appellate Division in May 2000.68 Much of this 
case pertains to matters outside the scope of the present paper, as it was decided on a 
different basis than the initial case before the High Court (before Le Roux, J), 
discussed above, and did not decide the validity of the rule of male primogeniture. 
The factual dispute regarding whether a customary marriage had existed between the 
applicant (now the appellant) and the deceased had been resolved at the continuance 
of the High Court case before Mynhardt, J, when it was accepted that the matter 
should be decided on the basis that there had been no customary marriage. 69 The case 
on appeal therefore turned on whether the appellant's daughter, who was accordingly 
the illegitimate daughter of the deceased, could inherit the house. The court a quo 
(Mynhardt, J) had found that she "was not a victim of gender discrimination because 
any illegitimate child of the deceased would have been disinherited." Mpati, AJA 
agrees: "As the court a quo held, Tembi, of course, is excluded from inheriting 
because she is illegitimate. The question of discrimination is not reached in this case 
68 Mthembu v Letsela (2000), supra note I. 
69 See Mthembu v Letsela (1998), supra note I. 
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... She would be in the same position as, for example, illegitimate male children". 70 
The court is accordingly not called upon to decide the validity of the rule of male 
primogeniture, but seems to accept it without qualification and warns against 
dismissing "an African institution without examining its essential purpose and 
content. "71 
The new constitutional dispensation has brought with it new and innovative ways of 
dealing with old problems, in order to ensure a society in which the full and equal 
enjoyment of human rights by all is the guiding force. It is disheartening that at the 
dawn of a new era in South Africa, one in which human rights should be paramount, 
the courts only superficially examined the way they are impacted by the rule of male 
primogeniture. 
Even more disappointing was the Magaya case, which was decided by the Supreme 
Court of Zimbabwe in 1999. As in the Mthembu case, the deceased had died intestate, 
but in this case leaving two wives. The appellant was the eldest child of the 
deceased's first wife and was female, while the respondent was a male child of the 
deceased's second wife (the eldest male child declined the heirship). A magistrate 
awarded the heirship to the respondent, on the basis that the appellant "is a lady (and) 
therefore cannot be appointed to (her) father's estate when there is a man."72 The court 
quoted Bennett, who states that "an heir inherits not only the deceased's property but 
also his responsibilities, in particular his duty to support surviving family 
dependants."73 The court's conclusion is that it is "common and clear" that "under the 
customary law of succession of the [Ndebele, Shona and Matahoie] tribes males are 
preferred to females as heirs."74 
In contrast to the Mthembu case, the court here does say that this rule prima facie 
constitutes discrimination against women in terms of the constitutional prohibition of 
70 Ibid., at 882D. It should be noted that discrimination against an illegitimate child contravenes Article 
2 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see discussion of this Convention infra), as well as 
Section 9(3) of the final Constitution. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but it is my contention that such discrimination is as unacceptable as gender discrimination. 
71 Mthembu v Letsela (2000), supra note 1, at 885A. 
72 Magaya v Magaya, supra note 1, at 2. 
73 Ibid., at 3, quoting Bennett, Human Rights and African Customary Law under the South African 
Constitution, at 136. See discussion of this aspect above. 
74 Ibid., at 3. 
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discrimination (contained in Section 1 of Zimbabwe's Constitution) and "on account 
of Zimbabwe's adherence to gender equality enshrined in international human rights 
instruments".75 It continues, however, by referring to Section 23(3) of the 
Zimbabwean Constitution, which it understood to mean that "matters involving 
succession are exempted from the discrimination provisions. "76 
The court then finds that the rule of male primogeniture does not violate Zimbabwe's 
Legal Age of Majority Act, 15 of 1982, as in its opinion, that Act was never intended 
to give a woman substantive rights, only powers that she formerly lacked. 77 In essence 
the conclusion is that women married in terms of customary law were given some 
limited procedural powers in terms of the Act, but that they do not have full power to 
make decisions affecting their lives, or their property. This is a blatant violation of the 
international human rights norms that will be discussed below. A full discussion of 
the powers given by the Act is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The appellant argued that women should not be excluded from being heirs in 
customary law, because "culture and custom are dynamic and change with changes in 
society and in particular the fact that urbanisation has made African society less and 
less partriarchal". While the court agrees that there is "a need to advance gender 
equality in all spheres of society'', it immediately raises the caveat that "great care 
must be taken when African customary law is under consideration." The court bases 
this on the contention that customary law has long directed the way African people 
conduct their lives and that it will not readily be abandoned, "especially by those 
senior males who stand to lose their positions of privilege."78 Perpetuating gender 
discrimination for fear of offending patriarchal power structures is unacceptable. A 
violation of fundamental human rights (and the rule of male primogeniture is clearly 
such a violation) cannot be preserved on the basis of history and the interests of the 
elite. 
75 Ibid., at 4. 
76 Ibid., at 5. 
77 Ibid., at 13. 
78 Magaya v Magaya, supra note 1, at 15. 
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Although the court gives great weight to indigenous law, it states that its application is 
"in a way voluntary" and that the court should not interfere with "a person's choice" .79 
Where custom and tradition are concerned, social norms and expectations make the 
concept of "choice" debatable, especially when one considers the lack of power of 
women in a patriarchal society and in terms of indigenous law. Moreover, the mere 
fact that people perhaps choose to be bound by indigenous law as it stands does not 
remove the court's duty to protect women and girls against any discriminatory 
provisions it may contain. This argument also disregards the position of daughters, 
who were not party to any choices made. 
The court then states that it is "prudent to pursue a pragmatic and gradual change 
which would win long term acceptance rather than legal revolution initiated by the 
courts", adding that the court does not have the capacity to make new law in a 
complex matter such as inheritance and succession, and that "all the courts can do is 
to uphold the actual and true intention and purport of African customary law against 
abuse". The court concludes that matters of reform should be left to the legislature.80 
I will return to the issue of whether change should be made by the legislature or the 
judiciary in a situation such as this. Either way, the court cannot abdicate its 
responsibility as totally as it did in this case. The court does nothing to start the 
process of "gradual change" it advocates, despite talking of gender equality. Instead it 
finds every argument it can to retain the status quo. In its treatment of the Legal Age 
of Majority Act, it has in fact retrogressed. 
The result of the Mthembu and Magaya cases is that women remain subject to 
discriminatory rules that are out of step with modern society. Moreover, the courts 
have not given women clarity on their right to inherit; declaring it dependant on 
whether or not, in a specific situation, a duty of support exists. 
VI. Violation of International Human Rights norms 
79 Ibid. 
80 Magaya v Magaya, supra note 1, at 16. 
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I have argued that the indigenous law rules relating to inheritance are not only 
corruptions of the original concepts, codified in such a way that they have lost their 
adaptability to social change, but also discriminate against women and affect them 
detrimentally. It is also my contention that these rules are in violation of international 
human rights norms and obligations. It is particularly important to consider 
international human rights law in countries that either do not have national bills of 
rights, or have bills of rights that exclude customary law from their ambit. 81 
A. Universality and Indivisibility of Human Rights 
All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. 82 The 
principle of universality is exemplified in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR): "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. 1183 Because all human rights apply to everyone without exception, the 
application of indigenous law does not deprive its subjects of their human rights. 
The indivisibility and interdependence of rights are also fundamental to international 
human rights law. All rights have equal status - in the application of one, all others 
have to be taken into consideration. Although the rule of male primogeniture offends 
specific individual provisions of international human rights instruments, as we will 
see, the argument becomes irrefutable when these provisions are read together, as 
complementing and reinforcing one another. 
B. Accountability 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)84 has been ratified 
by 144 countries, including South Africa, Zimbabwe and several others in Africa. 85 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)86 has 
81 See South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at xiv; see also supra note 76. 
82 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, at Part I, par 5. See 
also Dugard, International Law - A South African Perspective, (2000) at 254. 
83 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
84 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
85 For ICCPR ratification information, see 
http://untreaty.un.org!English/sarnple/EnglishlntemetB ible/partl/chapterTV /treatv5 .asp ; see also South 
African Yearbook oflntemational Law, Vol. 24 (1999), at 427. 
86 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). 
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been ratified by 142 countries,87 including Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Zimbabwe, 
among several other sub-Saharan African states. South Africa has not ratified it, but 
has signed it, signifying its intention to ratify at some stage. 88 The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)89 has been 
ratified by 166 states as of 7 September 2000, including South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
virtually every other state in sub-Saharan Africa. 90 The Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC)91 has been ratified by all members of the United Nations, except 
Somalia and the USA.92 This means that all states where women live under African 
indigenous law (with the exception of Somalia) are parties to the CRC. 
States voluntarily accept the obligation to implement a treaty when they sign, ratify or 
accede to it.93 Dugard notes that treaties normally require ratification in addition to 
signature and that this is normally indicated in the treaties themselves. 94 This enables 
states to reconsider their decision and, if necessary, to change their own laws to 
enable them to fulfil their obligations under the treaty.95 For example, South Africa 
signed CEDAW in 1993, and in the same year passed the General Law Fourth 
Amendment Act, "which removed all traces of legislative discrimination against 
women so as to enable South Africa to ratify CEDA W", which it did in 1995.96 
In some jurisdictions formal approval by the legislature may be required after 
ratification by the executive before a treaty enters into force as part of domestic 
legislation. This is the case in South Africa, for example, which requires "an Act of 
Parliament or other form of 'national legislation', in addition to the resolution of 
87 For ICESCR ratification information, see 
http://untreatv.un.org/English/sample/EnglishlnternetBible/partl/ chapter! V /treaty4 .asp; see also 
Dugard, supra note 82, at 242. 
88 See Dugard, supra supra note 82, at 242. 
89 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979). 
90 See official CEDA W web site at http://www.un.org/wornenwatch/dawlceda\V.'states.htrn for 
ratification information; see also 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/sarnple/Engl ish lntemetB ib Je/partl/chapterl V /treaty9 .asp . 
91 Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
92 For ratification information, see the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights treaty 
bodies database at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. The United States has signed the CRC, but has 
yet to ratify it. 
93 See Vienna Convention on the Law or Treaties (1980). 
94 Dugard, supra supra note 82 at 330. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. at 250. 
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ratification, for the incorporation of treaties into municipal law."97 In the period 
between signature or ratification of a treaty and its entry into force, a state is "obliged 
to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of [the] treaty".98 
Once a treaty has entered into force, the State Party is bound to perform its provisions 
in good faith99 and is accountable for bringing its national laws into line with it and for 
taking steps to ensure its implementation. 100 What this obligation entails will depend 
on the terms of the treaty in question. For example, the CRC contains obligations in 
every article, but also more broadly provides that: 
"States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative and 
other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present 
Convention. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties 
shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available 
resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-
operation.11101 (My emphasis) 
CEDA W provides in article 2 that "States Parties ... agree to pursue by all appropriate 
means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women ... ". 
Inter alia, they commit themselves to " take all appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices, 
which constitute discrimination against women" .102 Other specific steps listed include 
"appropriate legislative and other measures", "legal protection of the rights of women 
on an equal basis with men" and "all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women". Article 3 contains a broad provision relating to 
97 Ibid., at 56. See also Section 231(2) of the final Constitution. S 231(3) excludes treaties of a 
"technical, administrative or executive nature". Some jurisdictions distinguish between self-executing 
treaties, which become part of municipal law without such further legislative action and non-self-
executing treaties. See for example the proviso to S23 l ( 4) of the South African Constitution. A 
discussion of this aspect is not necessary for the purposes of this paper. 
98 Vienna Convention, supra note 93, Article 18. 
99 See Ibid., Article 26 - this is the principle known as "Pact a sunt servanda". 100 See Dugard, supra note 82 at 28. See also ibid, at 27. 101 Article 4. 102 Article 2(g) 
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measures to "ensure the full development and advancement of women" so as to 
guarantee their equal enjoyment of human rights. 103 
In ratifying the IC CPR, a State Party undertakes, " [ w ]here not already provided for by 
existing legislative or other measures ... to take the necessary steps, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant."104 A State Party to the ICESCR undertakes "to 
take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption oflegislative measures. 11105 
Therefore, where a State Party gives legal sanction to a practice that violates any of 
the treaties to which it is a party, or does not take steps (in particular legislative steps) 
to end the practice, it is violating its international obligations in terms of that treaty. 
In order to monitor compliance with treaties by States Parties, Committees consisting 
of independent experts, also known as treaty bodies, have been set up in terms of the 
various treaties. States Parties must present regular reports to the Committees on steps 
taken to implement the relevant treaty. These reports are scrutinised by the relevant 
Committee, which then issues its own report with comments and recommendations to 
the State Party on issues that require further action. 106 
C. Non-Discrimination 
Article 2 of the UDHR guarantees the rights it contains •:without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status." 
103 For a discussion of State Party obligations under CEDA W, see Cook, "State Accountability under 
the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women", in Cook (ed) 
Human Rights a/Women (1995), 228 
104 Article 2 
105 Article 2 
106 The ICCPR is monitored by the Human Rights Committee, the ICESCR by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CEDA W is monitored by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination of Women (the CEDA W Committee) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the 
CRC Committee) monitors implementation of the CRC. See Dugard, supra note 82, at 244-250. 
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In discussing this principle of non-discrimination, Dugard states that "the existence of 
such a norm derived from custom, general principles of law, and convention is 
beyond doubt. As far as conventional law is concerned, the affirmation of the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of race and sex contained in article 5 5 of 
the United Nations Charter has been confirmed by several international 
conventions.'' 107 These include the ICCPR108, the ICESCR,109 the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 110, 
CEDA W111 and the CRC. 112 Non-discrimination is the very raison d'etre of CEDA W 
and CERD. It is also an important principle in relevant regional human rights 
conventions, namely the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights (better 
known as the Banjul Charter)113 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child. 114 The denial to girls and women of their right to inherit property from their 
fathers or husbands is clearly a violation of this fundamental international human 
rights norm of non-discrimination. 115 
D. Relevant Human Rights Provisions 
In addition to the principle of non-discrimination, found in the UDHR and the treaties 
that followed it, the UDHR and several international and regional human rights 
treaties contain other provisions of relevance to the right of women and girls to 
inherit. 
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
101 D d ugar , supra note 82, at 247. 
108 ICCPR, supra note 84, Articles 2 (1), 3 and 26. 
109 ICESCR, supra note 86, Article 2(2). 
110 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965). 
111 CEDA W, supra note 89. Article I contains a broad definition of discrimination against women, 
including any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of sex, which impairs the recognition or 
enjoyment of their human rights by women. 
112 CRC, supra note 90. Article 2 prohibits discrimination on the basis of inter alia race, sex and ethnic 
or social origin. These basic principles were defined by the CRC Committee. See UNICEF Human 
rights for children and women: How UNICEF helps make them a reality, 1999, at 8. The fact that the 
principle of non-discrimination, discussed above, is a basic principle of the CRC means that girls may 
not be discriminated against in favour of boys, that they should have the same opportunities and enjoy 
the rights guaranteed in the CRC to the same extent. The rule of male primogeniture is a blatant 
violation of this principle. 
113 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981). It has been ratified by all African 
countries except Morocco. 
114 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990). 
115 It should be noted that in the South African context, discrimination must be "unfair" before it is 
prohibited in terms of Section 9 of the Bill of Rights. 
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The UDHR is not a treaty to which States can become parties, but rather a 
recommendatory resolution of the General Assembly. It has, however, had a profound 
impact on the development of international human rights, inspiring the International 
Covenants and subsequent treaties, serving as a model for national bills of rights and 
as a standard by which to measure the conduct of states. "Consequently it is argued 
that the Universal Declaration now forms part of customary international law" .116 It is 
"almost universally accepted that membership in the UN entails adherence to its 
principles." m 
In addition to its non-discrimination provisions discussed above, articles of relevance 
to the issue under discussion include Article 6 (recognition as a person before the 
law), Article 7 (equal protection of the law), Article 17 (right to own property), 
Article 22 (social security and economic, social and cultural rights), and Article 25 
(standard of living, including housing, social protection of children). One could, 
without difficulty, make a case that the rule of male primogeniture violates the 
UDHR. It is more fruitful, however, to turn to the covenants and conventions which 
built on the UDHR, as there can be no doubt about their binding force on States 
Parties, who have voluntarily agreed to be bound by them, and as they have detailed 
provisions that deal more specifically with the issue under discussion. 
2. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Due to the economic implications of implementing them, economic, social and 
cultural rights set out in the ICESCR"8 often receive less attention than civil and 
political rights. They are, however, well recognised in international human rights law. 
In ratifying the ICESCR, States Parties "undertake to ensure the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth" in 
it. " 9 The ICESCR guarantees the right to an adequate standard of living, which 
includes the right to adequate housing. Disputes between widows and heirs often arise 
in the context of whether the widow will be allowed to remain in the matrimonial 
home. 
116 Dugard, supra note 82, at 240-241. See Ibid., at 27-36 for a discussion of customary international 
law. 
m Human Rights Watch, Hostile to Democracy (1999), at 15, fn 3. 
"
8 The ICESCR protects, inter alia, the rights to work, social security, health and education. 
"
9 Article 3. 
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To date, the right to housing is the only right to which the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has devoted an entire general comment. 120 In General 
Comment 4, the Committee clearly states that the "right to adequate housing applies 
to everyone .. .In particular, enjoyment of this right must, in accordance with article 2 
(2) of the Covenant, not be subject to any form of discrimination. 11121 
The committee defines the right to housing as "the right to live somewhere in security, 
peace and dignity". 122 The concept of security of tenure is included in the Committee's 
definition of "adequate housing". 123 In its General Comment 7, which deals with 
forced evictions, the Committee added that women are 
"especially vulnerable given the extent of statutory and other forms of 
discrimination which often apply in relation to property rights (including home 
ownership) or rights of access to property or accommodation, and their 
particular vulnerability to acts of violence and sexual abuse when they are 
rendered homeless. The non-discrimination provisions of articles 2.2 and 3 of 
the Covenant impose an additional obligation upon Governments to ensure 
that, where evictions do occur, appropriate measures are taken to ensure that 
no form of discrimination is involved." 124 
Accordingly, where the rule of male primogeniture results in the forced eviction of a 
woman by the heir, or even where it jeopardizes her security of tenure, it is a violation 
of her right to "adequate housing" under the ICES CR. 
3. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
The preamble to CEDA W expresses the concern of States Parties that "despite these 
various instruments extensive discrimination against women continues to exist." It 
was therefore deemed necessary to adopt a treaty to focus specifically on eliminating 
the continuing discrimination against women. 125 
120 General comment no. 4 (1991 ), paragraph 7. 
121 Ibid., paragraph 6. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid., paragraph 8a 
124 General Comment 7 (1997), paragraph 10. 
125 See High Commissioner for Human Rights Fact Sheet 22, at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs22.htm 
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In terms of Article 5 of CEDA W, States Parties commit themselves to take all 
appropriate measures to "modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men 
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and 
all other practices which are based on the inferiority or the superiority of either of the 
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women". 126 It is clear that women and girls 
may not be denied their right to inherit property on an equal basis with men and boys 
due to cultural practices or indigenous law. 
The Convention is even more explicit in Article 16(1 )(h), which obliges States parties 
to "ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women ... [t]he same rights for both 
spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, 
enjoyment and disposition of property ... ". In commenting on Article 16(1)(h) in its 
general recommendation 21, 127 the CEDA W Committee urged States Parties to 
"include comment on the legal or customary provisions relating to inheritance laws as 
they affect the status of women " in their reports to the Committee. The Committee 
continued, 
"There are many countries where the law and practice concerning inheritance 
and property result in serious discrimination against women. As a result of this 
uneven treatment, women may receive a smaller share of the husband's or 
father's property at his death than would widowers and sons. In some 
instances, women are granted limited and controlled rights and receive income 
only from the deceased's property. Often inheritance rights for widows do not 
reflect the principles of equal ownership of property acquired during marriage. 
Such provisions contravene the Convention and should be abolished. "128 (My 
emphasis) 
This unequivocal statement by the CEDA W Committee removes any remaining doubt 
that the rule of male primogeniture is a violation of CEDA W. This was reinforced by 
126 Article 5 (a) 
127 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation 21 
(1994), paragraph 34. 
128 Ibid., par. 35. In this General Recommendation, the Committee also invoked Economic and Social 
Council Resolution 884 D (XXXIV), in which the Council recommended that States ensure that men 
and women in the same degree of relationship to a deceased are entitled to equal shares in the estate 
and to equal rank in the order of succession. 
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the CEDAW Committee's concluding observations on the report presented to it by 
South Africa in 1998, when it noted with concern "the continuing recognition of 
customary and religious laws and their adverse effects on the inheritance and land 
rights of women and women's rights in family relations .... 129 
In 1999, the General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW 
Convention. 130 It provides for the submission of individual complaints to the CEDA W 
Committee. These complaints must relate to violations of the individual's rights in 
terms of CEDA W by a State Party to CEDA W. When the Optional Protocol enters 
into force, it will give women an avenue ofrecourse for violations of their human 
rights that has not existed before. It is possible that a complaint relating to the 
inheritance rights of women in terms of indigenous law may come before the 
CEDA W Committee. In such a case the Committee will follow an inquiry procedure 
and issue recommendations to the State Party, which may be invited after six months 
to present a report to the Committee on remedial actions taken. 131 
4. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The CRC is the most widely ratified human rights treaty to date. 132 This gives it 
unparalleled legitimacy. In addition to the principle of non-discrimination it 
contains133 , it can be argued that the rule of male primogeniture violates two other 
basic principles of the CRC - the best interests of the child (Article 3) and the right to 
life, survival and development (Article 6). When a woman is denied the means to 
support her family or evicted from the family home, the best interests of children are 
jeopardised, as are their rights to survival and development. 
129 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Concluding Observations on the 
report of South Africa (1998), para.117. 
130 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (1999); see also Dugard, supra note 82, at 250. An Optional Protocol to a human rights treaty 
is a treaty in its own right and is open to signature, accession or ratification by countries that are parties 
to the main treaty. 
131 See Optional Protocol, supra note 130. 
132 See UNICEF, supra note 112, at 2; see also Dugard, supra note 82, at 250. 
133 See note 112, supra. 
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In terms of indigenous law, the children born of a marriage belong to the family of the 
husband. 134 Where there is a conflict between a widow and the heir, she may have to 
leave without her children, a violation of Article 9 of the CRC, which guarantees the 
right of the child not to be separated from his or her parents against his or her will. 135 
Such a situation may result in a host of violations of the rights of such children, 
including the above-mentioned Article 3, as well as the child's rights to health 
(Article 24), adequate standard ofliving (Article 27), education (Article 28), etc. In 
considering a potential violation of the rights of a child, all these rights must be 
considered together as part of one indivisible whole, in accordance with the principle 
of indivisibility. 
E. Regional Human Rights Treaties 
African human rights instruments differ from international instruments in that they 
have been developed against the backdrop of African culture and have, as Dugard 
says of the Banjul Charter, "a distinctly African character", although "inspired by 
other human rights conventions. "136 Two African human rights treaties are relevant to 
this discussion. 
1. The African (Banjul) Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights 
In addition to prohibiting discrimination (Article 2), the Banjul Charter guarantees 
equality before the law (Article 3). 137 This aspect is reinforced in Article 28, which 
provides that "every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow 
beings without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, 
safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance." 
The Banjul Charter is different from the other instruments that have been discussed -
not only is it a regional instrument, but it is focused to a large extent on collective, 
rather than individual rights. For example Article 18 provides for protection for the 
134 See for example, Armstrong et al., supra note 4, at 348. This is a violation of Article 16 of 
CEDAW. 
135 Article 18 is also relevant in this regard - it contains the principle that both parents have common 
responsibilities for the upbringing of the child. · 
136 Dugard, supra note 82, at 261. Dugard states that regional human rights instruments "are likely to be 
more successful than their universal counterparts because political and cultural homogeneity and shared 
judicial traditions and institutions within a region provide the basis for confidence in the system, which 
is necessary for effective implementation." Ibid., at 255. 
137 Banjul Charter, supra note 113; see Dugard, supra note 82, at 261. 
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family, which is "the natural unit and basis of society" and "the custodian of morals 
and traditional values recognized by the community." But even within this article, 
States Parties undertake to "ensure the elimination of every discrimination against 
women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as 
stipulated in international declarations and conventions." In other words, the family is 
only the custodian of morals and traditional values in so far as these do not 
discriminate against women. 138 The family that is protected is one in which women 
and girls enjoy equality with men and boys. 
2. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
The other relevant regional human rights instrument is the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, 139 which also contains distinctly African elements, 
although it was modelled on the CRC. It contains the principles of non-discrimination 
(Article 3), the best interests of the child (Article 4) and the survival and development 
of the child (Article 5), recognises the family as the "natural unit and basis of society", 
while guaranteeing equality of spouses (Article 18) and protects the child's right not to 
be separated from his or her parents against his or her will (Article 19). The same 
arguments regarding the rule of male primogeniture that were discussed above in 
relation to the CRC and the Banjul Charter apply here. 
F. World Conferences 
At several World Conferences during the 1990s, states committed themselves to take 
steps to implement human rights and ensure human development. States are not 
bound to implement the agreements reached at these world conferences as they are in 
relation to treaties. The agreements nevertheless have important norm-setting value, 
and governments are regularly called on to report on progress. 
In relation to the rule of male primogeniture, the agreements reached at the 1993 
World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993 140 and the 1995 Fourth 
World Conference on Women, held in Beijing141 are particularly relevant. The 
138 In this regard, see Armstrong et al., supra note 4, at 320-321. 
139 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, supra note 114. 
140 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 82. 
141 See United Nations Department oflnformation, Platform for Action and the Beijing Declaration, 
(1996). 
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Beijing Platform for Action, for example, states explicitly that governments must 
eliminate "the injustice and obstacles in relation to inheritance faced by the girl-child 
so that all children may enjoy their rights without discrimination, by inter alia, 
enacting, as appropriate, and enforcing legislation that guarantees equal right to 
succession and ensures equal right to inherit, regardless of the sex of the child."142 
VII. Cultural relativism vs. universal application of human rights 
An argument like the one I am making is bound to be countered with the assertion that 
the concept of human rights is foreign to the African legal tradition, which is founded 
on the concept of human dignity, 143 or that individual rights are recognised but only as 
subordinate to communal rights, 144 or that "outsiders" have no business interfering 
with culture or tradition or dictating what indigenous law should look like. An entire 
paper, or even a book, can be written on these issues. 
It is disingenuous to argue that the arguments for universal application of human 
rights are impositions from outside, coming from those who do not understand or 
respect a particular culture. This argument misses the crucial fact that there is already 
an internal debate on human rights and their relationship to indigenous law rules 
within African culture. 145 Women subject to indigenous rules have themselves 
recognized the discrimination they experience and are advocating and lobbying for 
change, relying on internationally recognised principles of human rights to support 
their case. The avalanche of protests by women and women's organisations to the 
Magaya case is a clear illustration of the internal debate on this issue. 146 
In any event, most states in sub-Saharan Africa have voluntarily undertaken 
obligations in terms of international human rights treaties, as well as regional treaties 
that are embedded in African culture. As discussed earlier, these obligations render 
states accountable in terms of international human rights law. They are in violation of 
these obligations when they (and this includes the judiciary - a branch of the state) 
142 Ibid., at 148-149, par 274(d). 
143 See Van der Meide, supra note 7, at 104. But see Reyntjens, supra note 21, at 47. 
144 See Church and Edwards, supra note 2, at 1252, Reyntjens, supra note 21, at 41, 47. 
145 See Kaganas and Murray, supra note 9, at 424, 426. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see 
Bronstein, supra note 3, at 401-403. 
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uphold practices and/or laws that violate the principles of the treaties they have agreed 
to implement, or when they fail to act to bring the law into conformity with the 
relevant international treaties. This is not a question of whether the elders in a 
particular community feel that their culture is being attacked. The question is whether 
States Parties are fulfilling their obligations in terms of international law. If not, they 
are required to take steps to do so. 
International human rights norms do not negate the essence of traditions or indigenous 
laws, but rather set certain minimum standards and guarantees, which may not be 
derogated from in practicising traditions and implementing rules of indigenous law. In 
this regard I disagree to some extent with Vahed, who is of the opinion that "it is 
imperative to note that human rights ... are not entirely universal. These rights should 
be interpreted in the context of the child's cultural and religious perspectives." 147 
Human rights are indeed universal, and although they may be interpreted in the 
context of culture and religion, they may not be derogated from on this basis. In other 
words, women cannot be denied substantive equality on the basis of religion or 
culture, as this would be a violation of international law obligations. Moreover, 
through agreements reached at World Conferences, states have reinforced - and often 
expanded on - their international obligations. These agreements are reached through 
negotiation and are not the imposition of "foreign values" on any culture. 
I have argued above that the rule of male primogeniture constitutes discrimination 
against women and girls - a violation of the human rights of women and girls 
guaranteed in international human rights treaties to which South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and other sub-Saharan African countries are party. As such these countries are under 
an obligation to take active steps to ensure the equal rights of women and girls to 
inherit. They have several options in doing so, including the adoption of legislation or 
resolution through the judiciary. 
146 See Njanji, "Zim women fight for lost rights", Mail and Guardian, 10 June 1999. 
147 Vahed, "Should the question: 'what is in a child's best interest?' be judged according to the child's 
own cultural and religious perspectives? The case of the Muslim Child", The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa (CILSA), Vol. 23. No. 3 (1999), 364, at 368. 
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VIII. Judicial resolution vs. legislative intervention 
The incremental development of the law through judicial precedent is one of the 
primary ways in which legal principles and rules remain relevant to the societies to 
which they apply. There are, however, instances where legislation is necessary. It is 
my contention that the customary law on succession falls into this category, primarily 
because leaving this issue up to the judiciary in the past has not worked. Decisions 
such as those in the Mthembu and Magaya cases have shown that the courts are not 
always sensitive to the ideological, historical and patriarchal underpinnings of the rule 
of male primogeniture as it now stands, nor to the distorted nature of "official" 
customary law. 148 A thorough investigation of these aspects is required if a fair and 
effective solution is to be found149 and legislation is more suited to this that judicial 
resolution, which is dependant on the "right" case coming before the courts. Having 
to wait for the right case to come to court before indigenous law can be brought into 
line with international human rights guarantees is contrary to the requirements of 
treaties for pro-active measures and decisive steps. 150 It is my submission that for 
States Parties to fulfil their obligations in terms of international law, legislation is the 
most suitable option. 151 It is speedy and ensures that a proper process is followed to 
bring about a clear result based on a policy decision to adhere to international law. It 
is also recommended in the treaties themselves, as noted above, and by the treaty 
bodies. For example, in its concluding observations on the report submitted by South 
Africa, the CEDA W Committee explicitly recommended that South Africa adopt 
legislation to ensure equality for women and to address, inter alia, unequal 
inheritance rights. 152 
148 The South African Law Commission discusses a study done in several sub-Saharan countries that 
showed that higher courts, "although aware of the fact that customary law operated in two registers (the 
'official' and 'living' versions) tended to refer only to the official version of customary law; and they 
applied this law strictly, without taking account of new social practices." South African Law 
Commission, supra note 2, at 25-26. On the other hand, lower courts, including courts of traditional 
leaders, were much more flexible. Ibid. at 26. The former of course have greater influence on the 
development of the law than the latter. 
149 See Kaganas and Murray, supra note 9, at 424. 
150 See Church, supra note 3, at 299. 
151 See also Church and Edwards, supra note 2, at 1261. 
152 CEDA W Concluding Observations, supra note 129, para. 118. 
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Courts themselves are not eager to "make" law. 153 As we have seen above, the court in 
the Magaya case was of the view that this was a matter for the legislature. 154 Both 
Mynhardt, J and Mpati, AJA in deciding the Mthembu cases were also of the opinion 
that legislation was required to reform the customary law of succession. Mpati, AJA 
observed that "[a]ny development of the rule would be better left to the legislature 
after a full process of investigation and consultation ... ". 155 Mynhardt, J had 
recommended that the same process be followed as was at the time being followed in 
reforming the customary law of marriage, which resulted in the adoption of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act. 156 
In other African countries, for example Malawi, Kenya, Ghana and Zambia, the 
customary law of succession has been revised by legislation. 157 Zimbabwe also has 
legislation on intestate succession, but this is unsatisfactory as it does not apply to all 
customary marriages. The potential for law reform in Zimbabwe is less likely in the 
light of the ongoing political turmoil. By contrast, the after-effects of the genocide in 
Rwanda (described above) has resulted in the adoption, in 1999, of a law regulating 
matrimonial property regimes and granting equal inheritance rights to women and 
girls.158 
The option of legislation is sometimes criticized on the basis that it is too rigid and 
restrictive. 159 But this overlooks the fact that the courts have tended to be rigid and 
restrictive in their interpretation of "official" customary law. 160 Ideal legislation would 
lay down certain minimum requirements, conditions and guarantees for women and 
153 See for example Freedman, "Islamic Marriages, the Duty of Support and the Application of the Bill 
of Rights -Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1997 12 BCLR 1716 (D)", Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins Hollandse Reg (THRHR), Vol. 61 (1998), 532, who discusses the approach of 
the High Court to Section 39(2) of the final Constitution, which requires courts, when interpreting any 
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law to promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights. The court found that it did not have a general power to develop the 
common law to do so. I agree with Freedman, who is of the view that this reading of the Constitution is 
"overly cautious". See Ibid. at 535. 154 See note 79, supra. 155 See South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at xiii. 156 Ibid. The adoption of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (which does not touch on 
inheritance rights) shows that it is possible to intervene legislatively in the area of indigenous law, even 
if the decision is not to adopt a uniform code. 157 See South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at 34 158 Law No. 22/99of1211111999 To Supplement Book I Of The Civil Code And To Institute Part Five 
Regarding Matrimonial. Regimes, Liberalities And Successions. 159 See Armstrong et al., supra note 4, at 323; Vahed, supra note 147, at 373-374. 160 See note 148, supra. 
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girls, without making the same error as was made in codifying customary law into 
inflexible rules. Such legislation could retain the spirit and true nature of indigenous 
law, not the currently codified distortion of it, while guaranteeing certain minimum 
rights to women and girls that may not be abrogated from on the basis of "culture". Of 
course such legislation would be open to interpretation by the courts, but they would 
now be interpreting rules that conform to international human rights guarantees of 
equality for women and girls, rules that have been enacted subsequent to a wide-
ranging process of consultation and research to ensure that they correspond to reality 
and not to out-dated views of a society based on patriarchal power structures and a 
subsistence economy. 
It may also be argued that, in several sub-Saharan African countries, there are 
constitutions in place that guarantee the equal rights of girls and women, and that 
further development of the law should be left up to the courts who are called upon to 
interpret the constitution. However, as I have submitted, the courts' attempts at 
applying the South African Bill of Rights to the rule of male primogeniture has not 
been satisfactory. In other countries, such as Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
customary law is shielded from the application of their Bills of Rights by their 
Constitutions. 161 
In 1998, the Amendment of Customary Law of Succession Bill, 109 of 1998, was 
introduced into the South African Parliament. The Bill aimed to extend the 
application of the general law of succession as embodied in the Intestate Succession 
Act, 81 of 1987 to all persons, with the necessary amendments made, and to make the 
provisions of the Administration of Estates Act, 66 of 1965 applicable. It also 
provided that the provisions of Section 23 of the Black Administration Act would 
become redundant on enactment of the Bill. Thus, if there is not a will then a wife in a 
customary marriage would be entitled to inherit ab intestato in the same way as would 
a woman married by civil rites in terms of the Intestate Succession Act. This would 
mean, for example, that if the husband died and there were no children, the widow 
would inherit her husband's estate in the same way as a widow married by civil rites 
would. 
161 See note 81, supra 
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However, due to hostile reaction from traditional leaders, a decision was taken not to 
proceed with the Bill and the investigation into the customary law of succession was 
referred back to the SALC as a matter of urgency. 162 As a result of this, and also 
triggered by the Mthembu cases, the SALC has prepared a Discussion Paper, in which 
it recommends reforming the customary law of succession by legislation, with a 
suggested draft Bill annexed. 
The draft Bill suggested by the SALC differs from the 1998 Bill mainly in that it 
excludes from its provisions succession to the office of traditional leader, and no 
longer refers to the Administration of Estates Act. It also makes the Intestate 
Succession Act applicable to customary marriages, with minor amendments, such as 
the recognition of polygynous unions. The approach of both the 1998 Bill and the 
draft Bill suggested by the SALC would completely change the current system of 
inheritance in terms of indigenous law. Primarily the aim and effect is to ensure 
equality for girls and women, and this is to be welcomed. It is however likely that the 
new draft Bill will also be criticised, because it retains nothing of indigenous law 
beyond recognising polygynous marriages. Its effect is to remove the discretion of the 
extended family in deciding matters of succession and inheritance (within the context 
of male primogeniture). In this regard it presents a departure from a dualist legal 
system, which the SALC professes to want to maintain. 163 The SALC does not explain 
why it omitted the provision regarding the Administration of Estates Act, but it may 
well be that this was to provide some flexibility in distribution. One hopes that this 
would not undercut the equality guarantees. It remains to be seen what the eventual 
legislation will look like. The South African Law Commission is currently 
considering responses to its Discussion Paper. 
IX. Legitimacy of legislation 
The first prerequisite for ensuring the legitimacy of legislation guaranteeing women 
equal rights to inheritance, is to involve women in the drafting of the legislation, and 
162 South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at x-xi. 
163 South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at xv and 13. 
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in particular African women. 164 Firstly, as Reyntjens puts it, "[t]hese rules provide a 
material, sexual, economic and moral dominance, which most men would only 
reluctantly abandon." 165 The presence of women is therefore needed to make sure that 
the issue of women's inheritance rights is placed on the agenda and is treated 
seriously. Secondly, the involvement of African women will ensure that the 
legislation drafted ensures equality, while remaining sensitive to the values of African 
culture. This is of crucial importance. 166 Thirdly, the fact that women, in particular 
women from within the culture, are involved in drafting such legislation, will 
effectively counter the argument that the law is a foreign imposition and will lend it 
greater legitimacy. Finally, women have deeply engaged in this issue, on personal and 
professional levels and have much to contribute to the process of drafting legislation. 
One of the reasons for the lack of legitimacy of the Constitutional Commission in 
Zimbabwe was that women were not adequately represented on it. 167 
Even this is not enough, however. It is unrealistic to think that legislation, however 
legitimate the drafting process, will have an impact at the grassroots level by itself, in 
particular in a context where those with power stand to lose some of their power as a 
result of it. A process of community level awareness-raising, in particular in 
communities where there is still strong adherence to indigenous law, must accompany 
the legislation. It should be incorporated into existing and new programmes for legal 
literacy, education and empowerment for women and girls. 168 At the same time, 
awareness-raising must be done among men and community leaders, to make them 
aware of the fact that the current rules and practice discriminate against women and 
violate their human rights. 
Legislation is necessary, not only to fulfill obligations of international human rights, 
but also to accommodate social changes that have taken place. However, there is still 
resistance to such change from those who feel threatened by it, or who have 
convinced others that their culture is threatened by it. Implementing legislation and 
164 In this regard the process followed by the South African Law Commission is commendable - not 
only are its legislative proposals on the customary law of succession open for comments from anyone, 
but it has also appointed an African woman to research the issue. 
165 Reyntjens, supra note 21, at 48. 
166 See Kaganas and Murray, supra note 9, at 428. 
167 See Moyo, "Women left out of Zimbabwean constitution process", Mail and Guardian, 8 July 1999. 
168 See Church, supra note 3, at 300. 
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gaining acceptance for it will therefore be a gradual process, one which, as 
Reyntjens169 puts it, "lies in the hands of women themselves." 170 
X. Conclusion 
"The time has come to remove elements of age and gender discrimination from the 
law and to provide the deceased's immediate family with more secure rights." 171 There 
are fears that such changes will result in the destruction of African culture. This so-
called conflict between culture and equality is greatly exaggerated. 172 It overlooks the 
fact that culture is "remarkably resilient" 173 - cultures are continually changing and 
nevertheless manage to survive. Historically many of these changes have taken place 
as a result of interaction with other cultures. 174 Indeed, changing inheritance laws to 
ensure equality of women will merely bring them into step with changes that have 
already taken place in African society. As we have already seen, "the 'lived' 
customary law is very different from the formal recorded rules. Under the stewardship 
of Parliament, the formal rules can be changed to reflect the reality." 175 
In any event, this argument really comes down to defending such discrimination as 
being "our culture". This is not enough of a basis for violating women's right to 
equality. "Protection of cultural rights becomes meaningless if it simply degenerates 
into a synonym for conservatism" .176 A culture should not need to subjugate half of its 
members - women and girls - in order to survive. Such characteristics have resulted in 
a loss of legitimacy for indigenous law. Eliminating discrimination will restore this 
legitimacy and, as a result, ensure greater adherence to its fundamental and unique 
tenets. 
169 Reyntjens, supra note 21, at 48. 
170 See also, Bronstein, supra note 3, at 407, who states that" ... women should be given the power to 
determine their own futures". 
171 South African Law Commission, supra note 2, at 39. 
172 See for example, Kaganas and Murray, supra note 9, at 425. 
173 Bronstein, supra note 3, at 399. 
174 See Ibid, at 394. 
175 Kaganas and Murray, supra note 9, at 427. 
176 Bronstein, supra note 3, at 397. 
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